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Abstract 
The Integrated Reporting (IR) Framework of 2013 represents the latest international attempt to 
connect a firm’s financial and sustainability (i.e., environmental, social and governance) performance 
in one company report. An IR should communicate “concisely” about how a firm’s strategy, 
governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation 
of sustainable value. At the same time, an IR needs to be “complete and balanced”, i.e., broadly 
including all material matters, both positive and negative, in a balanced way. Drawing on impression 
management studies, we examine a selection of performance determinants to gain insights into the 
factors associated with conciseness, completeness and balance in IR. The results from a sample of IR 
early adopters show that in the presence of a firm’s weak financial performance, the IR tends to be 
significantly longer and less readable (i.e., less concise), and more optimistic (i.e., less complete and 
balanced). We additionally find that firms with worse social performance provide reports that are 
foggier (i.e., less concise) and with less information on their sustainability performance (i.e., are less 
complete). Our evidence implies that IR early adopters employ quantity and syntactical reading ease 
manipulation as well as thematic content and verbal tone manipulation as impression management 
strategies. The results also suggest that such strategies depend not only on the level of firms’ 
performance but also on the type of performance (financial versus nonfinancial/sustainability). This 
paper adds to the limited literature on IR in sustainability accounting as well as to the research in 
mainstream financial accounting that examines disclosure quality using textual analysis.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a wide consensus that increasing the extent of corporate information disclosed (i.e., 
quantity) does not necessarily imply better disclosure (i.e., quality) of a firm’s actual 
activities (e.g. Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, & Marshall, 2015). In particular, investors and 
financial analysts denounce a perceived ‘information overload’ from financial disclosures 
without an increase in corresponding quality and usefulness for users. Increased disclosure 
quantity might therefore appear as a smokescreen for low disclosure quality and possibly low 
firm performance. For this reason, international standard-setting bodies have initiated public 
debates and issued discussion papers in an effort to bring the length of financial reporting 
disclosures under control and to increase their quality (EFRAG, 2012; ESMA, 2015; IASB, 
2013). 
The debate is complicated by the extant lack of convergence in the accounting literature 
on how to define and empirically disentangle disclosure quantity and quality. On the one 
hand, in the absence of a generally agreed model for disclosure quality, as well as relevant 
and reliable techniques to measure it, prior studies tend to use disclosure quantity as a proxy 
for disclosure quality (e.g. Botosan, 1997). On the other hand, researchers suggest that 
investigating only the volume of disclosure could be misleading (Plumlee, et al., 2015; Toms, 
2002). Provided that high quality reports should be concise and focused (i.e., not very long), 
making “quantity” a proxy of disclosure quality becomes questionable (Hooks & van Staden, 
2011). As a result, the question of how disclosure quality is best defined and measured and its 
relation with disclosure quantity and/or level has yet to be answered (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & 
Walther, 2010; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). 
A recent initiative intended to overcome the drawbacks in the format and usefulness of 
current financial reporting points at the Integrated Reporting movement (Baboukardos & 
Rimmel, 2016; Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Perego, Kennedy, & Whiteman, 2016; Soderstrom & 
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Potter, 2014) led by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). This emerging 
approach represents a relevant shift from existing reporting practices, which generally 
involve the production of financial statements in accordance with financial accounting 
standards and a separate, mostly voluntary, stand-alone sustainability report. Sustainability 
reports have a much broader scope than financial statements and encompass the social, 
human, environmental, and other dimensions of a firm’s operations. According to IR 
proponents, having separate reports makes the interconnections between the different 
dimensions of performance difficult to understand. Moreover, a specific Guiding Principle of 
the International Framework for Integrated Reporting released in December 2013 (labelled in 
this paper as ‘<IR>’; IIRC, 2013) is conciseness, which has been used by IR advocates to 
assert that it will ultimately assist in reducing the reporting burden for many organizations 
(IIRC, 2013: paragraphs 3.36-3.38). The emphasis on conciseness represents an innovative 
element with respect to prior attempts to enhance the disclosure quality of financial as well as 
nonfinancial/sustainability information. While the intention underlying the IIRC Framework 
is clear, there is nevertheless an “apparent tension” involved in providing a corporate report 
that is concise but also ‘complete and balanced’ (i.e., broadly including all material matters, 
both positive and negative, in a balanced way). It has to be noted that, in the IIRC 
Framework, balance and completeness are “grouped” together because they refer to the same 
overarching principle of “3F Reliability and completeness” (IIRC, 2013: paragraph 3.39). For 
this reason, in the following, we refer to completeness/balance1. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are not aware of any study that examined disclosure conciseness and 
completeness/balance in the novel setting of IR.  
The objective of our paper is twofold. First, we assess conciseness and completeness 
as key features underpinning an integrated report (IR) by developing a measurement 
																																								 																				
1 To be consistent with the IIRC Framework, we use the label “completeness/balance”, although in the 
following analyses we operationalize them separately.  
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approach that draws on both the IIRC Framework (IIRC, 2013) and extant accounting studies 
applying textual analysis of narrative disclosures in financial reporting (cf. De Franco, Hope, 
Vyas, & Zhou, 2015; Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015; Li, 2008, 2010; Loughran & McDonald, 
2016). We identify specific textual attributes that distinguish the concept of conciseness 
(measured by length and readability) from completeness and balance (captured by scope and 
tone, respectively) and explore the interplay among them. Second, we examine a selection of 
a firm’s performance-related determinants to gain insights into the factors associated with IR 
conciseness and completeness/balance. Our empirical analyses aim at documenting whether 
lower levels of conciseness and completeness/balance in IR are associated with a weaker 
firm’s performance. Such a relationship would confirm an impression management approach 
in an IR disclosure strategy, similarly to the obfuscation strategies detected in narrative 
disclosures examined in financial accounting (cf. Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007) and 
sustainability/environmental reporting studies (e.g. Arena, Bozzolan, & Michelon, 2015; 
Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Michelon, Pilonato, & Ricceri, 2015; Plumlee, et al., 2015).  
We examine a sample of IR early adopters that were involved in the IIRC Pilot 
Programme focusing on all the integrated reports available for the years 2013 and 2014 as of 
15th September 2015. Our findings show that, in the presence of a firm’s weak financial 
performance, the IR tends to be significantly longer, less readable (i.e., less concise) and 
more optimistic (i.e., less balanced), indicating the manifestation of obfuscation strategies. 
We also find support for the impression management argument because our results suggest 
that firms with worse social performance are foggier (i.e., less concise) and disclose less 
information on their environmental, social and governance issues (i.e., are less complete). 
Overall, our evidence implies that IR early adopters employ quantity and syntactical reading 
ease manipulation as well as thematic content and verbal tone manipulation as impression 
management strategies. We lend empirical support to the studies on narrative disclosures; 
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management may be induced to manipulate an IR through a combination of concealment 
strategies resulting in syntactically complex reports, the omission of information content and 
the obfuscation of bad news (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).  
Our study adds to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the stream of 
accounting literature that analyses lexical characteristics of narrative disclosures (De Franco, 
et al., 2015; Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015; Li, 2008, 2010). IR as an object of textual 
analysis provides a unique empirical setting for various reasons. The principle-based 
approach taken in developing the IIRC Framework enables variation in reporting practices, 
with firms having the opportunity to communicate proprietary information to stakeholders 
without being constrained to report in standardized ways. Such a discretionary approach 
offers a rich context to detect wide variation in practice that is not mirrored in more 
regulated, standard-based financial reporting disclosures. The integrated nature of this novel 
form of reporting allows a deeper understanding of the interconnections among disclosure 
characteristics that so far have been studied in isolation. Further, the current adoption of IR 
takes place across institutional settings with an interesting blend of mandatory and voluntary 
regimes and types of communication channels, making the setting rich in terms of variation 
in reporting practices and underlying theoretical determinants. Second, our study sheds light 
on the determinants of a firm’s narrative disclosure by drawing on and bridging two bodies of 
literature on impression management: the stream focused on voluntary environmental/CSR 
reporting (e.g. Cho, Michelon, & Patten, 2012) and the stream focused on corporate annual 
reporting (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). In addition, our paper examines several key 
textual attributes because management’s disclosure strategies are unlikely to incorporate 
separate manipulation strategies in isolation to the exclusion of others. Third, our empirical 
analyses examine for the first time the textual attributes of IR to assess the adherence of IR to 
the principles indicated by the IIRC Framework, highlighting some potential policy 
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implications. The IIRC pays a significant amount of attention to defining conciseness and 
completeness/balance as part of the core Guiding Principles, yet no attempt has been made so 
far to analyse these key attributes and the potential inherent tensions among them. Our 
methodology provides a foundation of analytical tools and empirical measures that the IIRC 
and IR preparers can leverage to benchmark IR disclosure quality.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
background and related literature and elaborates the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
sample examined and the research method. Section 4 presents the results of our main 
empirical analyses and additional tests. Finally, Section 5 provides conclusions, points at 
limitations of our study and suggests possible avenues for further research in this emerging 
area. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Background on Integrated Reporting and related literature 
In December 2013, the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) released the first 
International Framework for IR (IIRC, 2013). In brief, IR combines financial and 
nonfinancial disclosures of a company’s performance in one report. In terms of the process of 
IR, a salient feature is ‘integrated thinking’, defined as “the active consideration by an 
organization of the relationships between its various operating and financial units and the 
capitals that the organization uses or affects” (IIRC, 2013). An Integrated Report is thus 
intended to create an organization’s value creation story, by stimulating businesses to think 
about how they generate value in the short-, medium- and long-term horizons. The adoption 
of IR is further expected to tackle a number of problems presented by conventional, stand-
alone sustainability reports, such as the failure to account for all sources of value creation, the 
complex interconnections between sustainability and financial performance, and the effective 
communication of a company’s business model (Eccles & Krzus, 2010). 
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Several initiatives have emerged in different regions of the world to trigger greater 
‘integrated thinking’ as promoted by the IIRC Framework (Busco, Frigo, Riccaboni, & 
Quattrone, 2013; Frías-Aceituno, Rodríguez-Ariza, & García-Sánchez, 2013; IIRC, 2013). 
South Africa was the first country to mandate listed companies to produce an IR. The IIRC 
Pilot Programme has actively engaged a group of over 100 companies and 30 institutional 
investor networks to test IR in their organizations. In addition, current EU legislation, in 
particular the Directive 2013/34/EU on the annual financial statements, addresses the 
disclosure of non-financial information and raises the debate on the role of IR in supporting 
companies to comply with the novel European legislation. Given that IR is still in the early 
stages of adoption, it is not surprising that a number of conceptual and applied challenges 
have emerged. Similarly, the research in this area is still embryonic (see Baron, 2014; de 
Villiers, Rinaldi, & Unerman, 2014; Perego, et al., 2016; Soderstrom & Potter, 2014; Velte & 
Stawinoga, 2016 for recent reviews of the debate in this novel area). Researchers tend to 
focus on the expanding sample of IR early adopters to assess whether these firms show 
specific isomorphic organizational or country-level drivers compared to non-adopting firms. 
For instance, Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013) document that growth opportunities, the size of a 
company, board size and board gender diversity are significant drivers of IR for all three 
corporate governance national models (i.e., Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Latin). In turn, 
companies implementing IR are more likely to originate from countries with higher investor 
protection and be located in civil law countries and regions where indices of law and order 
are high (Frías-Aceituno, et al., 2013; Jensen & Berg, 2012). Lai et al. (2014) show that firms 
adopting IR do not face more sever legitimacy threats compared to non-adopters.  
Another strand of recent archival studies focuses on the relationship between IR 
adoption, IR quality and market reactions (see Perego, et al., 2016; Velte & Stawinoga, 2016 
for a complete literature review). For example, Barth, Cahan, Chen & Venter (2016), 
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Bernardi & Stark (2016) and Lee & Yeo (2015) provide evidence of a positive link between 
IR quality and market reactions (e.g., firm value, analyst forecast accuracy and stock 
liquidity) for IR adopters in South Africa, where a reporting regime change occurred in 2010 
(King Report). Other studies (Arguelles, Balatbat, & Green, 2015; Mervelskemper & Streit, 
2015) examine worldwide voluntary samples and find a similar positive association between 
IR adoption or IR quality (measured or proxied differently) and variables capturing market 
reactions, thereby confirming IR as a beneficial signal towards investors and the financial 
community. Despite this initial evidence, however, the current definition and measurement of 
IR quality remains highly questionable. Overall, there is a lack of studies on the quality of the 
disclosure produced in IR with a few exceptions (Melloni, 2015; Melloni, Stacchezzini, & 
Lai, 2015; Stacchezzini, Melloni, & Lai, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has 
been made so far to assess the extent to which IR adheres to intended Guiding Principles 
proposed by the IIRC Framework promulgated in 2013, except for the materiality-related 
contents, which has been an object of limited investigation (Fasan & Mio, 2016; Khan, 
Serafeim, & Yoon, 2016). 
In this paper, we focus on conciseness and completeness/balance as key IIRC 
principles underpinning an IR. In achieving conciseness, an IR should “express concepts 
clearly and in as few words as possible” and “favor plain language over the use of jargon or 
highly technical terminology” (IIRC, 2013 p.22). In addition, an IR should be complete and 
balanced by including “all material matters, both positive and negative, in a balanced way” 
(IIRC, 2013 p.21). A firm that publishes an IR is thus expected to reach an appropriate 
compromise between conciseness and completeness/balance because there is an apparent 
tension between them (IIRC, 2013). As argued in the introduction, our objective is to identify 
possible factors associated with varying levels of conciseness and completeness/balance. We 
draw on prior accounting literature that used textual analysis (for financial reporting 
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disclosure e.g. De Franco, et al., 2015; Li, 2010) to examine four narrative disclosure 
characteristics, i.e., amount, readability, scope and tone, which capture conciseness and 
completeness/balance as core principles underlying this novel form of corporate reporting. 
The next section provides a literature review of the related financial accounting stream that 
emerged in recent years. 
2.2. Literature on textual analysis of financial reporting disclosure 
A growing stream of accounting literature examines narrative disclosure i.e., unstructured 
textual information that is presented by companies in addition to numeric data (Beattie, 
McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Li, 2010). This body of research has grown thanks to the 
increased electronic availability of corporate documents and to the improvement of the 
analytical tools that can be used to investigate textual information. Researchers, who were 
once limited by the need of manually coding data, can now leverage the developments of 
computational linguistics and statistics for data reduction, i.e., to aggregate information 
included in large texts into manageable indexes (Core, 2001).  
In fact, the definition of disclosure indexes, which is based on the principles of 
content and textual analysis (Boyatzis, 1998), can be human coded or computer aided 
(Beattie, et al., 2004). The advantages of human coding are precision and the possibility of 
customizing it to the specific research needs. However, the manual approach is very costly, is 
less replicable due to subjectivity and, being extremely time-consuming, constrains the 
sample size. On the contrary, the most important advantages of using computer programmes 
for the analysis, besides efficiency, are related to the fact that the rules for coding text are 
made explicit; therefore, tools for inquiry generate formally comparable results and allow the 
accumulation of research findings. In addition, the computer-aided tools provide higher coder 
reliability for content/textual analysis using either a rule-based or dictionary approach and/or 
a statistical approach. The former builds disclosure indexes using mapping algorithms that 
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classify words and phrases into different categories based on pre-defined rules (i.e., 
dictionary), whereas the latter is based on the use of statistical techniques to conduct content 
analysis.  
Notwithstanding these technological and methodological developments, the debate on 
how to assess narrative disclosure remains open, and previous contributions have emphasized 
the need to develop improved disclosure measures (Core, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001). More 
specifically, existing research has mainly focused on measuring the amount of disclosure 
(i.e., quantity) that companies provide in their annual report (Botosan, 1997; Hope, 2003b) or 
specific aspects for certain disclosures, such as accounting policies (Hope, 2003a) and risk 
disclosure (Bozzolan, Trombetta, & Beretta, 2009). Much less attention has been devoted to 
linguistic features, an important dimension of disclosure that is related to its quality (Li, 
2008).  
Prior contributions analysing lexical characteristics used disclosure indexes to study 
characteristics such as readability (De Franco, et al., 2015; Li, 2008, 2010), tone (Davis & 
Tama-Sweet, 2012), and repetitiveness (Li, 2010) to infer disclosure quality. The question of 
how disclosure quality is best defined and measured and its relation with disclosure level has 
yet to be conclusively answered (Beyer, et al., 2010). Oftentimes, disclosure quality is either 
equated with  ̶ or seen as a function of  ̶  disclosure level (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008; 
Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007; Shalev, 2009), making the findings in this stream of 
research mixed (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; Li, 2008). Moreover, although managers set up a 
holistic disclosure policy, the existing literature tends to examine one disclosure characteristic 
or textual attribute at a time (Beyer, et al., 2010). In developing our hypotheses, we draw 
upon this stream of research and bridge it with the literature on impression management that 
focuses on corporate disclosure.  
2.3. Hypothesis development 
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To develop the reasoning behind our hypotheses, we refer to previous contributors who 
pointed to the fact that narrative disclosures can be employed to “facilitate the construction of 
a new and different image of the company” and therefore improve its legitimacy in the wider 
world (Hopwood, 2009: 437). Warsame & Pedwell (1998) observe that managers prefer 
accounting narratives rather than financial or other quantifiable information because the 
former can be designed and customized to manage public impressions. This can be performed 
by self-servingly biasing the amount of information disclosed, the scope of topics, and the 
verbal tone of the disclosures (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Thus, corporate management 
can use narrative disclosures as an impression management tool (cf. Brennan, Guillamon-
Saorin, & Pierce, 2009). Impression management is defined as reporting bias introduced by 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers who select a style of presentation and choice of 
content that is beneficial to them. This assumes a conscious and deliberate managerial 
disclosure strategy (Bowen, Davis, & Matsumoto, 2005; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007) 
Previous studies of annual report narratives (Clatworthy & Jones, 2001; Smith & 
Taffler, 2000; Sydserff & Weetman, 2002; Yuthas, Rogers, & Dillard, 2002) argue that 
companies use certain language features to try to positively influence stakeholder 
perceptions, and managers strategically manipulate the opinions and decisions of 
stakeholders through narrative disclosures. According to Merkl-Davies & Brennan’s (2007) 
impression management framework, managers manipulate primarily either the presentation 
(language and verbal tone) or the disclosure (quantity, thematic content, and attribution) of 
the information presented. Impression management strategies can be based on concealment, 
by both employing thematic content manipulation and/or including more positive than 
negative keywords (corporate communications tend to use a positive tone whenever possible) 
as well as convoluted terms (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 
2011; Rutherford, 2003). Therefore, on the one hand, managers can skew the disclosure tone 
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more positively than what is justified (Davis & Tama-Sweet, 2012) and leverage verbal 
complexity to befog unpleasant information (Henry, 2008). On the other hand, by 
manipulating the amount of information provided on different aspects, they can direct 
attention to good news and turn attention away from undesirable information (Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992).  
The reasoning behind the impression management framework is consistent with the 
‘management obfuscation hypothesis’ by Li (2008), which maintains that managers have a 
greater incentive to obfuscate information when firm performance is bad, whereas they are 
willing to be forthcoming in their disclosures when their respective companies are performing 
well (Lang & Lundholm, 2000; Schrand & Walther, 2000). Li (2008) develops his argument 
drawing upon Bloomfield’s (2002) incomplete revelation hypothesis, which, in turn, is an 
application of the equilibrium described by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), who show that in 
efficient markets, the return to analysing data must equal the cost of analysis. The incomplete 
revelation hypothesis suggests that managers can decrease the market response to bad news 
by making bad news costlier to analyse. In other terms, the obfuscation hypothesis implies 
that managers of poorly performing firms may use impression management strategies to 
make bad news costly by writing long annual reports with unreasonably complex words and 
convoluted sentences. 
A similar reasoning that draws on impression management can be found in the rather 
limited set of past studies that examine disclosure strategies in voluntary 
sustainability/environmental reporting (Berthelot, Cormier, & Magnan, 2003; Cho, Patten, & 
Roberts, 2014). This literature conceptually posits that corporate managers self-servingly use 
their discretion to manipulate the perceived image of their firm. Managers are thus expected 
to deliberately obfuscate failures (concealment) and emphasize success (image enhancement) 
to improve their reputation and compensation or alter users’ perceptions of corporate 
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achievements in an attempt to convince stakeholders to accept the management’s view of 
society (Cho, Freedman, & Patten, 2012; Cho & Patten, 2007; Patten, 2002). 
Several studies in the sustainability accounting literature provide evidence of the 
impression management hypothesis embedded in legitimacy theory (Hummel & Schlick, 
2016; Nègre, Verdier, Cho, & Patten, 2017). This stream mostly draws on content analysis of 
sustainability/environmental disclosure. For instance, Jones (2011) shows that companies 
from high environmental impact industries tend to apply a selective inclusion strategy in the 
graphs displayed in corporate sustainability reports. In a similar vein, Cho et al. (2012) 
confirm both the presence of image enhancement and obfuscation in this type of graph. More 
recently, Plumlee, et al. (2015) draw upon Clarkson, et al. (2008) to develop a disclosure 
index that classifies the nature (positive/negative/neutral) and type (soft/hard) of 
environmental disclosure. Their findings show a significant positive association between 
disclosure quality and the cost of equity components for soft/positive environmental 
disclosure, lending implicit support that only subjective disclosure appears to affect firm 
value. Michelon, et al. (2015) provide evidence that stand-alone sustainability/environmental 
reporting is not associated with higher disclosure quality, suggesting a symbolic, rather than 
substantive, role of these disclosure practices. Companies that produce stand-alone 
sustainability/environmental reports appear to convey more information than companies 
without, yet this information also seems to be diluted within other irrelevant pieces of 
information.	 Contrary to an impression management prediction, the content analyses 
performed by Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes (2004), Arena, et al. (2015) and Clarkson, 
et al. (2008) indicate that environmental disclosure is used as a signal to reveal superior 
performance, lending support to the incremental information or signalling theory posited in 
voluntary disclosure theory. Overall, the findings from this stream of literature remain far 
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from conclusive because of the variety of specifications applied to content-analyse and 
classify sustainability/environmental disclosure indices.  
To the best of our knowledge, few studies rely on computer-aided tools to perform a 
textual analysis in this area. Cho, et al. (2010) document that the worst environmental 
performers use more ‘optimistic’ language (image enhancement) and less ‘certainty’ 
(obfuscation) than better performing peers. Similarly, Bakar & Ameer (2011) support the 
obfuscation hypothesis, demonstrating that low (high) performing firms, in terms of 
profitability, liquidity and growth, achieved a low (high) CSR disclosures readability score. 
Starting from these premises, in this paper, we examine conciseness and 
completeness/balance as key principles of the IIRC Framework. We propose a method that 
captures conciseness and completeness/balance using textual attributes of IR that combine, 
for the first time, length, reading ease, scope and tone.  
=== Insert Figure 1 about here === 
We posit that the properties of conciseness and completeness/balance defined by the IIRC 
Framework embed two dimensions, namely an “amount” dimension and a “style” dimension 
(see Figure 1). The first one refers to the contents of the IR, whereas the second one refers to 
its form. In fact, the IR Framework (IIRC, 2013: paragraph 3.36-3.38) maintains that an IR to 
be concise should “express concepts […] in as few words as possible”, pointing to the length 
of the report, and “favor plain language over the use of jargon or highly technical 
terminology”, emphasizing the importance of its readability. At the same time, completeness 
and balance refer to the inclusion of “all material matters, both positive and negative, in a 
balanced way” (IIRC, 2013: paragraph 3.39). Specifically, completeness denotes “the extent 
of information disclosed” (IIRC, 2013: paragraph 3.47-3.48) and suggests the disclosure 
scope or topic coverage, whereas balance points at tone intended as a neutral representation 
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of information, not to be “manipulated to change the probability that it will be received either 
favourably or unfavourably” (IIRC, 2013: paragraph 3.44). 
In line with the impression management hypothesis, we argue that the levels of 
conciseness and completeness/balance vary systematically depending on firm performance, 
both financial and nonfinancial/sustainability. We draw on prior research (Bakar & Ameer, 
2011; Cho, et al., 2010; Clatworthy & Jones, 2001; Plumlee, et al., 2015; Smith & Taffler, 
2000; Sydserff & Weetman, 2002; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; Yuthas, et al., 2002) and expect 
that firms with low levels of performance use contents as well as language and verbal tone to 
bias the message presented in their IRs. On the contrary, managers of high-performing firms 
have no incentive to deliberately obfuscate or mislead communication. Therefore, we posit 
that firms with weaker performance exhibit significantly less conciseness and less 
completeness/balance, i.e., the IRs of firms that are performing poorly should be longer, more 
difficult and complicated to read (less concise), have a more limited topic coverage (less 
complete) and a more optimistic tone (less balanced) compared to firms with high levels of 
performance. We formulate the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:	
H1: Firms with weaker financial performance are associated with less concise, namely 
longer (H1a) and less readable (H1b), Integrated Reports. 
H2: Firms with weaker financial performance are associated with less complete and 
balanced, namely with a lower information scope (H2a) and a more optimistic tone 
(H2b), Integrated Reports. 
H3: Firms with weaker nonfinancial performance are associated with less concise, namely 
longer (H3a) and less readable (H3b), Integrated Reports. 
H4: Firms with weaker nonfinancial performance are associated with less complete and 
balanced, namely with a lower information scope (H4a) and a more optimistic tone 
(H4b), Integrated Reports. 
In addition to testing the aforementioned hypotheses, we explore the interplay between the 
four dimensions included in Figure 1 in terms of impression management strategies. In fact, 
the matrix shown in Figure 1 can be interpreted by focusing on columns instead of rows to 
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capture two dimensions of disclosure strategies: one related to quantity and thematic content 
manipulation (measured by length and scope of information) and the other related to 
syntactical reading ease and verbal tone manipulation (measured by readability and tone). In 
our additional analysis, we apply exploratory factor analysis to understand how the four 
dimensions of disclosure relate and combine with each other (in terms of conciseness and 
completeness/balance and/or in terms of thematic and content manipulation and syntactical 
read ease manipulation).  
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample  
We focus on firms that are members of the official IIRC Pilot Programme (which ended in 
October 2014) and analyse their 2013 and 2014 reports, if publicly available on the 15th 
September 2015. The Pilot Programme has represented a platform for businesses to apply the 
principles of IR and share their practices with the IIRC. This sample identification strategy 
led to the analysis of 148 reports issued by 74 unique firms (one per year). The IR reports 
belong to firms from all continents and operating in different industry groups, as shown in 
Tables 1 and 2.  
=== Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here === 
Data on the disclosure variables is based on a textual analysis of firms’ IR, whereas 
performance data and controls are collected from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters ASSET4. 
However, not all the firms have data available in the above-mentioned datasets. This explains 
why the subsequent regression analyses rely on 104 observations.  
3.2. Measures of disclosure variables 
Conciseness 
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Drawing on previous studies (e.g. De Franco, et al., 2015; Li, 2008) and based on the IR 
definition (IIRC, 2013), we argue that conciseness can be captured in the following ways.  
The first one, suggested by De Franco, et al. (2015) based on Li (2008), is the length 
of the report. This variable can be computed as the natural logarithm of the number of pages 
(or the number of characters or words) of the entire document. All these measures have 
already been used in the literature to measure the amount of information provided in 
corporate reports and they can be easily calculated and interpreted (Cowen, Ferreri, & Parker, 
1987; De Franco, et al., 2015; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Li, 2008). In our paper, we use the 
natural logarithm of the number of pages for the main analysis, and the logarithm of both the 
number of characters and the number of words in our sensitivity tests. 
As argued, and based on the definition of IR (IIRC, 2013), conciseness also embeds a 
“style” dimension, i.e., readability, which can be measured by using the Fog index. This 
index derives from the computational linguistics literature and has been used to measure 
readability in previous studies on corporate narrative disclosure (e.g. De Franco, et al., 2015; 
Li, 2008; Twedt & Rees, 2012). The Fog index combines the number of words per sentence 
and the number of syllables per word to measure reports’ readability under the assumption 
that more words per sentence or more syllables per word make a document harder to read. It 
is calculated as follows: Fog = (words_per_sentence + percent_of_complex_words) * 0.4 
Words with three syllables or more are defined as complex. The index indicates the 
number of years of formal education a reader of average intelligence would need to read the 
text once and understand that piece of writing with its word-sentence workload. In particular, 
the relation between the Fog and reading ease is as follows: Fog >=18 (unreadable); 14–18 
(difficult); 12–14 (ideal); 10–12 (acceptable); and 8–10 (childish). 
In summary, we use two different measures to capture conciseness in IRs. The natural 
logarithm of the total number of pages is used to measure the length of the report, and the 
18 
	
Fog Index is used to measure its readability. While both these indicators capture conciseness, 
the first one is related to its dimension in terms of “amount” of disclosure and the second one 
is related to its “style” dimension.  
Completeness/balance  
In addition, for completeness/balance, we draw on previous studies and on the IR definition 
(IIRC, 2013), and we argue that completeness/balance can be captured in the following two 
ways.  
First, because determining completeness includes the consideration of the extent of 
information disclosed, we assess IR completeness measuring the coverage of specific topics 
and, specifically, of ESG topics. In this respect, we use the “Bloomberg ESG disclosure 
scores” (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Lai, Melloni, & Stacchezzini, 2016). Bloomberg is the 
most widely used data provider for financial and other corporate data, including sustainability 
ones, and produces ESG scores from company-sourced fillings. In contrast to other data 
providers, Bloomberg does not estimate any of the ESG data: all data points can be linked 
back to their primary source. Past research has indicated that these disclosure scores are the 
ones that attract the most attention by investors (Eccles, Serafeim, & Krzus, 2011; Ioannou & 
Serafeim, 2015). Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores measure the degree of coverage of 
environmental, social, and governance issues. The four scores (ESG disclosure score, 
environmental disclosure score, social disclosure score and governance disclosure score) 
range from 0-100 and capture how many of the possible ESG topics a company is reporting 
and are based on both quantitative and qualitative information. It is also important to note that 
these scores are industry specific. This characteristic makes the ESG scores particularly 
suitable for our purposes as the IIRC (2013) has explicitly stated that, to assess completeness 
of an IR, consideration should be given to “what organizations in the same industry are 
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reporting on because certain matters within an industry are likely to be material to all 
organizations in that industry”. 
With reference to balance, we focus on the tone of information, and specifically on the 
level of optimism (Davis & Tama-Sweet, 2012; Rogers, Van Buskirk, & Zechman, 2011). In 
fact, according to the IIRC, a balanced IR does not have any bias in the presentation of 
information to change the probability that it will be received either favourably or 
unfavourably. To capture this aspect, we use the optimism index provided by DICTION 
(version 7.0). DICTION supports text analysis geared towards not only the form but also the 
meaning of words (Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). We use DICTION to determine the tone of a 
verbal message in line with previous accounting studies (Cho, et al., 2010; Davis & Tama-
Sweet, 2012; Henry, 2008; Rogers, et al., 2011; Sydserff & Weetman, 2002; Yuthas, et al., 
2002). This software is considered particularly attractive to accounting researchers 
investigating impression management. Previous studies conducted in various fields indicate 
that DICTION has strong empirical validity (Alexa & Zuell, 2000; Davis, Piger, & Sedor, 
2012; Short & Palmer, 2008). The automated procedure avoids problems caused by the 
subjectivity typical of manual coding (Davis & Tama-Sweet, 2012; Short & Palmer, 2008) 
and allows comparison between studies thus favouring cumulating the results within a 
specific stream of research. 
Among the various linguistic categories, we focus on the so-called “optimism score” 
that has been employed by previous contributors as a verbal tone measure (e.g. Cho, et al., 
2010). DICTION defines optimism as “language endorsing some person, group, concept or 
event or highlighting their positive entailments” and the related score is computed using this 
formula: 
DICTION Optimism = [praise+satisfaction+inspiration]-[blame+hardship+denial].  
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Given the way in which it is calculated, this score emphasizes the optimism versus pessimism 
or positive versus negative nature of the communication, i.e., the higher the score, the more 
the text is skewed towards an optimistic tone, whereas the lower the score, the more balanced 
the extent of positive and negative language used in the text. Therefore, the DICTION 
optimism score appears to be particularly suitable for our purposes. In particular, DICTION 
standardizes these six variables, then adds or subtracts them, adds a constant of 50, and then 
provides a slight statistical correction by referencing DICTION’s normative databank (50,000 
previously analysed texts). The user may apply these general norms or select from among 
thirty-six sub-categories, including speeches, poetry, newspaper editorials, business reports, 
etc. Indeed, a distinctive feature of DICTION is its use of normative values for comparative 
purposes allowing the application of dictionaries specifically tailored for particular types of 
disclosures (including corporate financial reports). In our main analysis, we consider the 
optimism score with “corporate financial report” as a normative profile because it carries the 
advantage of being designed specifically for use in a financial context, whereas in the 
additional test, we employ the score targeted at “all” forms of communication. We use 
“standardize scores” meaning that DICTION extrapolates each particular text to a 500-word 
norm equivalent (which is the basic unit of analysis) so that input texts of any length can be 
measured consistently.  
In sum, for completeness/balance, we employ two different measures: one to capture 
the completeness “amount” dimension, i.e., the ESG disclosure score, and one to capture the 
“style” dimension of balance, i.e., the optimism index. This choice is consistent with prior 
sustainability accounting literature, which focuses on the completeness as the 
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quantity/comprehensiveness of disclosure as distinct from the tone of the disclosure (e.g. 
Larrinaga, Carrasco, Correa, Llena, & Moneva, 2002; Zahller, Arnold, & Roberts, 2015)2.  
3.3. Model  
We examine the association between conciseness or completeness/balance and corporate 
financial and nonfinancial performance (environmental, social and governance) using an OLS 
pooled regression model with panel data, referring to years 2013 and 2014, with the 
following general form (with firm and time subscripts suppressed):  
DISCLOSURE CHARACTERISTICS = α0 + α1 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE + α2 
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE + α3 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE + α4 
GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE + CONTROLS + εt 
All variables used, their definitions, and measures are presented in Table 3.  
=== Insert Table 3 about here === 
The dependent variables in the regression are the disclosure characteristics, i.e., for 
conciseness, the logarithm of the number of pages (ln_length_page) and Fog index 
(fog_index); for completeness, the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score (esg_disc); and for 
balance, the optimism score (opt_cr). 
Our test variable, i.e., performance, is defined with reference to both financial and 
nonfinancial performance, reflecting a balanced view of a company’s performance in four 
areas: financial, environmental, social and corporate governance. Specifically, in Model 1, we 
employ an accounting-based performance measure, the Return on Equity (roe) to measure 
financial performance and the social (soc_score), environmental (env_score) and governance 
score (gov_score) provided by ASSET4 to measure social, environmental and governance 
																																								 																				
2 In Larrinaga et al. (2002) disclosure completeness is measured as the extent to which the company complied 
with every standardized item, for a minimum of zero and a maximum of seven items (completeness index). In 
the experiment by Zahller et al. (2015) completeness is operationalized as the inclusion of items within the 
Sustainability Report across a range of nonfinancial performance areas and the disclosure of both positive and 
negative performance within these areas (High Completeness). Low Completeness, on the other hand, reports 
only a few areas within the Sustainability Report and discloses only good performance. 
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performance. ASSET4 is a division of Thomson Reuters that specializes in providing 
objective, relevant, auditable and systematic sustainability information, which has been used 
extensively in prior studies on sustainability. The social score measures a company's capacity 
to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of best 
management practices. It is a reflection of the company's reputation and the health of its 
license to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability to generate long-term 
shareholder value. The environmental score measures a company's impact on living and non-
living natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It 
reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks 
and capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long-term shareholder value. 
Finally, the corporate governance score measures a company's systems and processes, which 
ensures that its board members and executives act in the best interests of its long term 
shareholders. It reflects a company's capacity, through its use of best management practices, 
to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of incentives, as well 
as checks and balances to generate long-term shareholder value performance (Cheng, 
Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).  
Previous impression management studies consider firm size and industry as control 
variables influencing disclosure choices. Specifically, having a large size and belonging to 
environmental sensitive industry groups could favour the adoption of impression 
management strategies (e.g. Cho, et al., 2010). Larger firms are subject to more public 
pressure than smaller ones and are thus more likely to manipulate the disclosure offered in 
their corporate reports. Similarly, firms that belong to industries in which the processes put 
greater stress on the natural environment have greater incentives to bias the disclosure. We 
distinguish three industry groups, Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials and Utilities, 
classified as environmental sensitive (industry=1); Financials (industry=2); and Consumer 
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Goods, Health Care, Consumer Service, Technology and Telecommunication (industry=0). 
Similarly, we include a variable to proxy firms’ size in the regression as the natural logarithm 
of the volume of sales (ln_sales).  
In line with Li (2008), we also consider a control variable that refers to the age of the 
firm (age), defined as the number of years since the company’s incorporation: older firms 
face less information asymmetry and uncertainty and therefore the disclosure characteristics 
of their reports may differ from those of younger firms (e.g., being less foggy/more concise). 
For the same reasons, we also control for the volatility of the business (volatility) computed 
by Bloomberg and defined as the stock's average annual price movement to a high and low 
from a mean price for each year. For example, a stock's price volatility of 20% indicates that 
the stock's annual high and low price has shown a historical variation of +20% to -20% from 
its annual average price. We control for firms’ continent (continent), in line with previous 
cross-country studies on corporate disclosure (e.g. Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014; 
Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013) and the emergent literature on IR ascribing differences in the 
IR disclosure practices to regional, institutional factors (Jensen & Berg, 2012). Within the 
regions, however, there is significant variation in accounting standards. Thus, it seems 
appropriate to control also for the accounting standard used by including a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if firms adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (ifrs) and 0 
otherwise, in line with previous literature in international accounting (Lang & Stice-
Lawrence, 2015). Finally, we include a proxy of analyst coverage (n_analyst_recc) drawing 
on previous research on disclosure (Allee & Deangelis, 2015) and a dummy variable (year) to 
control for the effect of time. In all models, we use clustered standard errors at firm level to 
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address autocorrelation3 and perform the Variance Inflator Factor (VIF) test to assess whether 
multicollinearity could affect our results. 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum of the continuous variables are 
presented in Table 4. With reference to the length, the untabulated results show that the mean 
length of these reports is equal to 184 pages (in Table 4, we present the transformed variable). 
The textual analysis reveals that the mean of the Fog index is equal to 16.1289, suggesting 
that the reports, on average, are very difficult to read. The average ESG disclosure scores 
yield 49.0247 points out of 100, meaning that companies are reporting less than half of the 
environmental, social and governance items that Bloomberg expects them to report. The 
average optimism score is equal to 49.8874 which is relatively high compared to the scores 
obtained by other studies on environmental disclosure (e.g., Cho et al., 2010).  
=== Insert Table 4 and Table 5 about here === 
Our correlation analysis shows that there are statistically significant relationships among the 
disclosure indexes measuring conciseness, namely length and readability. With reference to 
disclosure completeness/balance, no significant associations are highlighted between 
disclosure tone and ESG topics, as reported in Table 5. Pertaining to the association between 
conciseness and completeness/balance, we find that these disclosure characteristics seem to 
																																								 																				
3 In our empirical model, we control for autocorrelation drawing on Petersen (2009) using clustered standard 
errors at firm level. Petersen (2009) provides an extensive review and analysis of the various methods used to 
address correlations across time and/or firms and recommends that if a firm effect is suspected to be present, the 
standard errors should be clustered by firm. He claims “clustered standard errors are unbiased, produce correctly 
sized confidence intervals in the presence of either temporary or permanent firm effects, and are robust to 
heteroscedasticity.” 
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be partially in trade-off. Indeed, our analysis shows that reports that are longer/less concise 
tend to be more balanced as they are less optimistic4.  
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
The results of the main OLS regressions are presented in Table 6 distinguishing between 
different types of performance (financial vs nonfinancial, i.e., social, environmental and 
governance). Regarding financial performance as the determinant of conciseness and 
completeness/balance (Model 1), the results show that firms with weaker financial 
performance, i.e., lower ROEs, provide reports that are significantly longer (at 5% level of 
significance) and foggier (at 1% level of significance) consistently with the impression 
management argument. Therefore, H1 is supported with reference to conciseness expressed 
through both the “amount” (i.e. length, H1a) and the “style” (i.e. readability, H1b) 
dimensions. 
The results show a negative although weakly significant (at 10% level) relationship 
between financial performance and ESG disclosure scope. We also find a negative and 
significant association between financial performance and the level of optimism (at 5% level 
of significance) in line with impression management. Therefore, H2 is also supported with 
reference to balance (H2b) measured with tone (i.e., “style” dimension) but not with 
reference to completeness (H2a) captured with ESG topics scope (i.e., “amount” dimension). 
On the contrary, firms with worse financial performance provide more extensive disclosure 
on ESG topics. 
=== Insert Table 6 about here === 
																																								 																				
4 Largely consistent relationships (untabulated) emerge even after considering other measures of readability (e.g. 
Flesch grade index and Flesch reading ease), length (log of number of words, log of number of characters), tone 
(DICTION optimism score with “all” as normative profile) and ESG topics (specifically environmental 
disclosure score, social disclosure score and governance disclosure score).  
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Regarding nonfinancial performance, our evidence highlights a negative and statistically 
significant relationship (at 5% level) between social performance (soc_score) and fog and a 
positive and statistically significant relationship (at 1% level) between social performance 
(soc_score) and esg_discl_score. These results confirm the impression management 
argument, as firms with worse social achievements are foggier (i.e., produce less concise 
reports) and disclose less information on their ESG issues (i.e., produce less complete 
reports). Therefore, with reference to nonfinancial performance, H3b considering the “style” 
dimension (i.e., readability) and H4a considering the “amount” dimension (i.e., 
completeness) are supported. 
 Findings on control variables show that older firms provide less complete reports in 
terms of ESG disclosure topics (at 1% level) and that firms with higher price volatility 
produce reports that are significantly shorter and less foggy. The results also show that firms 
belonging to environmental sensitive industries tend to draft IR that are significantly longer 
(i.e. less concise) whilst firms belonging to the financial sector are less complete in terms of 
ESG topics. In addition, the findings flag significant differences in disclosure behaviours 
across continents. In particular, European firms draft reports that are significantly less foggy 
(i.e. more concise), with higher ESG disclosure scope (i.e. more complete with reference to 
the “amount” dimension) but more optimistic (i.e. less balanced with reference to the “style” 
dimension) compared to firms from other continents (i.e., Africa). Finally, we find that IFRS 
adopters are associated with more balanced as well as more complete reports in terms of ESG 
topics (at 1% significance level).  
4.3. Additional tests 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we run some additional tests. Firstly, we 
perform the same multivariate analyses considering different measures of the disclosure 
variables (Table 7). We use the logarithm of the number of words and characters 
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(ln_length_words and ln_length_characters) and we employ two additional readability 
indexes: the Flesch-Kincaid Grade level and the Flesch Reading Ease5. The Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade level (also called the “Flesch–Kincaid formula” or the “Kincaid Index”) rates texts by 
US grade school levels. Therefore, a score of 8.0 means that the document could be 
understood by an average eighth grader. The Flesch Grade Level has been used in previous 
accounting studies (e.g. De Franco, et al., 2015; Laksmana, Tietz, & Yang, 2012; 
Subramanian, Insley, & Blackwell, 1993). The Flesch Reading Ease formula is used to assess 
the difficulty of a reading passage written in English and considers the number of words, 
sentences, and syllables in reading material for adults. The output is a number ranging from 0 
to 100 and the higher the number, the easier the text is to read6. With reference to the 
association between these variables and both financial and nonfinancial performance, our 
results remain substantially unchanged. With reference to optimism, we adopt the “all norms” 
disclosure index (optimism_all) rather than the “corporate report norm” one. This means that 
we consider the normative profile tailored to “all forms of communication” to assess the 
robustness of our results. Our results for both the financial and the nonfinancial performance 
variables remain largely unchanged.  
=== Insert Table 7 about here === 
Secondly, we run Model 1 by using one unique measure of nonfinancial performance, 
defined as the average of the three specific nonfinancial performance scores capturing 
environmental, social and governance performances (esg_perf_score). Again, the results 
																																								 																				
5 This index is measured as follows: Flesch-Kincaid Grade = (11.8*syllables per word) + (0.39 *words per 
sentence) -15.59. The Flesch Reading Ease index is calculated as follows: Flesch Reading Ease = 206.8 - 
(1.015*words per sentence) - (84.6*syllables per word).	
6 The score is related to reading ease approximately as follows: 90–100 (5th grade); 80–90 (6th grade); 70–80 (7th 
grade); 60–70 (8th and 9th grade); 50–60 (10th–12th grade); 30–50 (college years); and 0–30 (college graduate). 
The Flesch Reading Ease is commonly employed in accounting research (e.g. De Franco, et al., 2015; 
Laksmana, et al., 2012).	
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(untabulated) show that the financial performance is significantly associated with all 
disclosure variables (with the exception of the ESG disclosure score), consistently with the 
main multivariate analysis. For the nonfinancial one (expressed through the esg_perf_score) a 
positive and statistically significant relationship is shown with esg_discl_score (at 1% level).  
Thirdly, we perform the same multivariate analyses (Model 1) with a different 
measure of performance, i.e., a market-based measure instead of the accounting-based ROE, 
the market to book value (m_bv). This variable captures the performance of the firm in terms 
of future growth/investment opportunities and/or the level of intangibles. More generally, it 
should be apt to capture the “invisible value” omitted from financial statements (Lev, 2001; 
Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Ming-Chin, Shu-Ju, & Yuhchang, 2005). The use of this indicator is in 
line with previous studies on corporate disclosure (Brennan, 2001; De Franco, et al., 2015; 
Li, 2008).	The (untabulated) results obtained are consistent with those already reported with 
reference to current financial performance measured with ROE. In addition, we also show a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between env_score and esg_discl_score. This 
result supports the idea that firms with worse environmental performance tend to disclose less 
on ESG topics and is again consistent with the impression management argument (H4). 
Fourthly, we run the same multivariate regression model (Model 1) substituting the 
missing values with the mean and the median of each variable. With reference to financial 
performance, the results remain largely unchanged with the exception of the optimism score 
that is not significantly associated with the financial performance. Also, by substituting the 
mean value, no significant relationship is highlighted between financial performance and 
disclosure length. Considering nonfinancial performance, the results support the relationship 
between social performance and ESG disclosure score but not with the fog index.  
Finally, because the various textual attributes are not independent and to obtain a 
more parsimonious representation of relationships among attributes, we additionally combine 
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the four characteristics using exploratory factor (principal component) analysis (see Lang & 
Stice-Lawrence, 2015 for a similar approach). Results of the factor analysis are exhibited in 
Table 8. Both models presented (without and with factor rotation) indicate that Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 are appropriate for inclusion in additional tests. Eigenvalue of both factors exceed 
1.0, with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score at 0.496 (thus slightly under the critical threshold of 
0.5) and the Bartlett's test of sphericity significant at p=0.006. In both models, the attributes 
measuring length and scope of IR are associated with Factor 1, while readability and tone 
load high on Factor 2. The interpretation of the exploratory factor analysis points thus at a 
combination of textual attributes per column (refer to Figure 1), with disclosure length and 
scope capturing quantity and thematic content manipulation (Factor 1) while readability and 
tone linked to syntactical reading ease and verbal tone manipulation (Factor 2).  
=== Insert Table 8 and Table 9 about here === 
The regression results presented in Table 9 show a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between financial performance and the two factors in both models (at 1% level). 
This means that lower financial performance is associated with higher value of both quantity 
and thematic content manipulation (Factor 1) and syntactical reading ease and verbal tone 
manipulation (Factor 2).  
5. Discussion and conclusions  
Our paper adds to the debate on disclosure quality by analysing the lexical features of IRs and 
by aiming to understand its most important determinants, with a specific focus on 
performance. Our research is related to the growing body of papers applying textual analysis, 
primarily in the US. Outside the US, there is less empirical evidence on textual report 
disclosure (Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015), and we are not aware of research that specifically 
examines the novel setting of IRs. There is a variety of textual attributes that we could 
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explore to characterise IR disclosure: we focus on three that potentially affect quite 
significantly the quality of IRs and are thus likely to be of interest to investors and regulators 
in terms of policy implications. We concentrate our attention on conciseness, completeness 
and balance, and we examine their relationship in the setting of IR as well as their association 
with performance, both financial and nonfinancial/sustainability. 
Regarding the relations between performance and conciseness and 
completeness/balance, our findings are in line with the impression management argument 
empirically confirmed by previous studies in financial and environmental/sustainability 
reporting. In particular, firms with lower financial performance tend to produce longer, more 
complex reports unbalanced towards optimism. Interestingly, such reports are also more 
complete with reference to environmental, social and governance topics, possibly signalling a 
disclosure manipulation strategy where the aim of the companies with weaker financial 
performance is to re-direct the attention from the “hard” numbers to nonfinancial “softer” 
aspects of their performance. This is in line with Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari 
(2008), who pointed to the fact that weak performers may try to distract investors from 
objective measures of performance by using claims to be committed to ESG issues and soft 
discretionary disclosures, such as the environmental profile and initiatives. Overall, the 
evidence provided is consistent with the idea that firms that record weak financial 
achievements adopt simultaneously different impression management strategies based on 
quantity, thematic content manipulation, syntactical reading ease and verbal tone 
manipulation (Brennan, et al., 2009; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).  
 Regarding the association between nonfinancial/sustainability performance and 
conciseness and completeness/balance, our results, though partial, are in line with previous 
sustainability/environmental contributions, such as Al-Tuwaijri, et al. (2004) and Clarkson, et 
al. (2008). In fact, the evidence collected shows that firms with worse social performance are 
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less complete in terms of ESG disclosure, supporting the fact that companies with lower 
social results are less prone to disclose “sustainability” topics, i.e., those topics that are more 
in line with this type of nonfinancial performance. Moreover, firms with weaker social results 
provide reports that are foggier, consistent with the impression management argument. This 
suggests that firms with low social performance adopt impression management strategies 
more based on syntactical reading ease manipulation and thematic content manipulation, 
especially focusing on “fine-tuning” ESG topics coverage (Brennan, et al., 2009; Merkl-
Davies & Brennan, 2007). Our results on nonfinancial performance (the positive relationship 
between social performance and ESG disclosure) could also imply that companies with better 
social results are more willing to disclose ESG topics. Therefore, drawing on Arena, et al. 
(2015), our findings lend support to the incremental information or signalling theory posited 
in voluntary disclosure theory (Clarkson, et al., 2008). They are also in line with the findings 
by Hummel & Schlick (2016), who show that superior sustainability performers choose high-
quality sustainability reporting to signal their better performance to the market, whereas poor 
sustainability performers disclose low-quality sustainability information to conceal their true 
performance while trying to maintain their legitimacy.  
In sum, our evidence suggests that there might be different disclosure strategies 
depending not only on the level of firms’ performance, as suggested by previous studies but 
also on the type of performance. In this respect, our findings shed light on the importance of 
focusing on both financial vs nonfinancial/sustainability performance when aiming at 
detecting impression management strategies. In addition, irrespectively of the IR 
Framework’s emphasis on conciseness and completeness/balance, our evidence seems to 
suggest that, in practice, firms struggle to provide reports that are concise, complete and 
balanced. In this sense, the implementation of an IR might work as a trigger for companies to 
embrace a dynamic process of learning that can lead to the rethinking of their reporting 
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systems and practices. Because the IR is a relatively new idea, a lead-time is probably 
required to achieve its full potential in terms of improving disclosure quality. IR 
implementation can be appreciated as a far-reaching learning process for companies (cf. 
Maniora, 2015). 
While this research contributes to understanding some disclosure characteristics and its 
determinants, specifically in the novel context of IR, our analysis is subject to several 
caveats. Firstly, we rely on the computations made with a specific software (i.e., DICTION) 
to estimate disclosure tone variables. The debate on textual measures is still evolving: textual 
analysis is an emerging area in accounting and finance, and, as a result, the corresponding 
taxonomies are still somewhat imprecise. However, the imprecision of textual analysis is not 
something that precludes its usage, but it is a characteristic that must be confronted in 
producing empirical results that are expected to have credible impact and can be reasonably 
replicated (Loughran & McDonald, 2016). In our paper, we favoured replicability and the use 
of standardized measures. An avenue for future research would be developing new, 
customized measures of the attributes of corporate disclosures based on manual content 
analysis (Plumlee, et al., 2015) and/or performing our analyses with tools other than 
DICTION (e.g., Rogers, et al., 2011) .  
Secondly, it would be interesting to consider additional firm characteristics that may 
influence the incentives to manipulate disclosure, such as specific corporate governance 
variables other than the governance score (García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). It could 
also be of interest to investigate the costs and benefits associated with producing IRs with 
different characteristics to understand the interplay between economic and strategic motives 
of managers’ disclosure behaviours.  
Thirdly, by focusing on firms that voluntarily commit to the IR movement, the findings 
of our study have potential policy implications towards the IIRC and government bodies. 
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However, we acknowledge that this research design is prone to potential endogeneity and 
self-selection bias issues. Given the novelty of IR, our sample includes only two years, which 
makes it very difficult to identify how IR changes when performance changes. We are 
therefore careful in not inferring causal relationships from the evidence we present, and we 
describe our findings as associations. Nonetheless, the use of standard errors clustered by 
firm adequately addresses correlations across time and/or firms issues (Petersen, 2009). 
Alternative methods and tests to assess the robustness of our results will become feasible in 
the future with the addition of more years of IRs.  
Finally, future studies should compare the IIRC Pilot Programme companies, 
considered in this study, with matched, larger samples of non-IR firms, or with companies in 
South Africa, where IR has been mandatory since 2011. As underlined by Brennan, et al. 
(2009), impression management predominantly occurs in less regulated narrative disclosures. 
It would be interesting to assess whether mandating this particular form of corporate 
reporting may help to improve disclosure characteristics, as well as to understand whether, in 
a context where the IR is relatively less new, companies have achieved a better combination 
of conciseness and completeness in reports. This comparison would reveal whether the 
struggle of firms in providing IRs that are both concise and complete is related to a learning 
process that it is still underway or to deliberate choices of managers aiming at strategically 
manipulating stakeholders’ opinions and decisions through a firm’s disclosures.  
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Figure 1. Textual attributes capturing conciseness, completeness/balance (with reference      
to paragraphs of the IIRC Guiding Principles in brackets) and impression management 
strategies 
       
              
 Quantity and thematic 
content 
manipulation 
Syntactical reading  
ease and verbal tone 
manipulation 
            
 
   
 
Amount  
of disclosure 
Style  
of disclosure 
Length 
(3.36-3.38 Conciseness) 
Readability 
(3.36-3.38 Conciseness) 
Scope 
(3.47-3.48 Completeness) 
Tone 
(3.44 Balance) 
 
 
	  
41 
	
Table 1. Sample demographics by industry	
Industry name Percent 
1       Oil & Gas 5.41 
1000 Basic Materials 13.51 
2000 Industrials 18.92 
3000 Consumer Goods 9.46 
4000 Health Care 4.05 
5000 Consumer Services 8.11 
6000 Telecommunications 2.70 
7000 Utilities 13.51 
8000 Financials 18.92 
9000 Technology 5.41 
Total 100 
This table provides sample demographics distinguishing between the 10 Industry classification 
benchmark (ICB) groups.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample demographics by continent 
Continent  Percent 
Africa 6.76 
Asia 10.81 
Europe 54.05 
North America 9.46 
Oceania 4.05 
South America 14.86 
IFRS adopter 83.11 
Total 100 
This table provides sample demographics distinguishing between the 6 continents groups.  
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Table 3. Variables definition and measurement	
Variable 
acronym 
 
Variable Definition  Measurement 
Dependent  
 Conciseness  
ln_length_page Length  Natural logarithm of the number of pages of the reports 
fog Fog readability index  (words_per_sentence + percent_of_complex_words)* 0,4 
Completeness   
esg_discl_score ESG disclosure score  Bloomberg ESG disclosure score  
Balance 
optimism_cr 
 
Optimism score  
 
DICTION optimism score standardized and based on "corporate 
report" norm  
Independent    
roe Return on equity  (Net Income Available for Common Shareholders / Average Total 
Common Equity) * 100 
soc_score Social performance  ASSET4 social score 
env_score Environmental 
performance  
ASSET4 environmental score 
gov_score Governance 
performance  
ASSET4 governance score 
Controls    
ln_sales Size  Natural logarithm of the volume of sales (US $) 
age Age of the firm  Number of years from the date of first incorporation  
volatility Price volatility  Measure of the stock's average annual price movement to a high 
and low from a mean price for each year 
n_analysts_recc Analysts’ coverage  Number of analysts’ recommendations 
industry Industry   Industry dummies: Health Care, Consumer Goods, Consumer 
Service, Technology and Telecommunication (=0); Oil and Gas, 
Basic Materials, Industrials and Utilities industry group (=1); 
Financials (=2) 
continent        Continent  Continent dummies: Africa (=0 as benchmark); Europe (=1); Asia 
and Australia (=2); North America and South America (=3). 
ifrs IFRS adopter  Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm adopts the international 
financial reporting standards and 0 otherwise 
year Year  Year dummies: 2013 (=0); 2014 (=1) 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev  Min  Max 
ln_length_page 104 5.0023 0.7157 2.0794 6.3936 
fog 104 16.1289 1.3993 12.2000 20.2000 
esg_discl_score 104 49.0247 10.9218 12.3967 66.3900 
optimism_cr 104 49.8874 1.2559 45.9800 53.9400 
roe 104 20.2899 55.7921 -52.1515 426.4706 
soc_score 104 88.5681 11.1351 27.2600 97.0700 
env_score 104 83.7393 15.7289 12.3600 94.7200 
gov_score 104 71.4178 23.0946 9.5800 96.1800 
ln_sales 104 9.7157 1.4209 5.9353 11.9340 
age 104 55.5865 42.1195 6.0000 184.0000 
volatility 104 23.0861 8.0544 10.2200 45.6800 
n_analyst_recc 104 25.0481 10.2903 5.0000 53.0000 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) of 
the sample. Variables definition: fog is the fog readability index; ln_length_page is the logarithm of 
the number of pages; optimism_cr is the DICTION standardized optimism score with norm “corporate 
report”; esg_discl_score is the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score; roe is the return on equity; 
soc_score is the ASSET4 social score; env_score is the ASSET4 environmental score; gov_score is 
the ASSET4 governance score; ln_sales is the logarithm of the volume of sales ($); age is the age of 
the firm; volatility is the (annual) price volatility; n_analyst_recc is the number of analysts’ 
recommendations. 
 
44 
	
Table 5. Pairwise Correlations matrix  
 
 
  ln_length_page fog esg_discl_score optimism_cr roe soc_score env_score gov_score ln_sales age volatility 
fog 0.2090**           
esg_discl_score 0.1516 0.0762 
 
 
 
      
optimism_cr -0.2641*** 0.0911 -0.0969  
 
      
roe -0.1949** -0.1576 -0.1233 0.0618 
 
      
soc_score 0.0950 -0.0741 0.6301*** 0.0253 0.0212       
env_score 0.0700 0.0172 0.4223*** 0.0113 0.0880 0.6498***      
gov_score 0.0191 0.1492 -0.0393 -0.0072 0.1054 0.1544 0.1971**     
ln_sales 0.1812* 0.0229 0.3311*** -0.1212 -0.1148 0.3846*** 0.3806*** -0.0416    
age -0.0302 -0.0843 -0.0491 -0.2456** -0.1444 0.0882 0.2401** 0.0260 0.2040**   
volatility -0.1627* -0.0698 -0.0611 -0.0631 -0.2983*** -0.1486 -0.2850*** -0.0939 -0.1466 0.1078  
n_analyst_recc 0.3128*** -0.0969 0.2030** -0.1429 -0.0633 0.3471*** 0.3981*** 0.0491 0.4843*** 0.0890 -0.1509 
This table provides the pairwise correlation coefficients between all the continuous variables. All the variables are defined and measured as in Table 3. A 
correlation coefficient marked *, **, *** indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.  Model 1 
  ln_length_page fog esg_discl_score optimism_cr 
roe -0.0022** -0.0076*** -0.0186* -0.0030** 
  (-2.53) (-5.86) (-1.74) (-2.19) 
soc_score -0.0012 -0.0263** 0.4459*** 0.0238 
  (-0.15) (-2.28) (4.65) (1.61) 
env_score 0.0017 0.0066 0.1737 -0.0014 
  (0.36) (0.66) (1.55) (-0.13) 
gov_score -0.0040 0.0100 -0.0094 0.0006 
  (-1.05) (1.64) (-0.18) (0.09) 
ln_sales -0.0092 0.0401 0.9292 -0.1057 
  (-0.16) (0.40) (1.10) (-1.04) 
age -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0674*** -0.0048 
  (-0.91) (-0.20) (-2.75) (-1.13) 
price_volatility -0.0237* -0.0554*** -0.0018 -0.0161 
  (-1.90) (-2.82) (-0.01) (-0.67) 
n_analyst_recc 0.0139 -0.0017 0.1145 -0.0216 
  (1.33) (-0.10) (0.99) (-1.44) 
industry 
env_sens_ind 0.4051** 0.3996 1.5849 0.3525 
  (2.25) (1.09) (0.67) (1.25) 
financial_ind 0.0031 0.2594 -11.1603*** 0.4634 
  (0.01) (0.34) (-3.25) (0.72) 
continent 
europe 0.0634 -1.1057* -6.8096** 0.7953* 
  (0.19) (-1.91) (-2.06) (1.85) 
australasia  -0.7318 -1.6855** -2.2926 1.0792* 
  (-1.52) (-2.65) (-0.53) (1.98) 
america -0.5891* -0.2331 -2.3490 0.7606** 
  (-2.00) (-0.49) (-0.86) (2.05) 
ifrs -0.2324 0.0881 8.7268** -1.4715*** 
  (-0.67) (0.21) (2.62) (-2.95) 
year (2014) 0.0116 0.9796*** -1.9024* 0.1191 
  (0.12) (4.86) (-1.77) (0.56) 
_cons 5.9190*** 18.4924*** -13.8408 50.3738*** 
  (6.24) (10.52) (-1.00) (29.66) 
N 104 104 104 104 
R-sq 0.375 0.327 0.605 0.257 
adj. R-sq 0.268 0.212 0.538 0.131 
F 6.397 8.471 38.34 5.273 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression (Model 1). All the variables are defined and 
measured as in Table 3. All robust standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate that the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T statistics 
are in brackets. DISCLOSURE = α0 + α1 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE + α2 SOCIAL 
PERFORMANCE + α3 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE + α4 GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE 
+ CONTROLS + εt 
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Table 7.  Additional analysis (1)  
  
ln_length_ 
words 
ln_length_ 
characters flesch_read flesch_grade optimism_all 
roe -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0361*** -0.0074*** -0.0023** 
  (-0.60) (-1.26) (6.60) (-5.47) (-2.48) 
soc_score -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0982** -0.0252** 0.0076 
  (-0.18) (-0.01) (2.05) (-2.18)  (0.74) 
env_score -0.0005 0.0084 0.0398 0.0094  0.0020 
  (-0.09) (1.41) (-0.93) (0.86)  (0.26) 
gov_score -0.0039 -0.0016 0.0018 0.0047 0.0010 
  (-0.71) (-0.37) (0.07) (0.81)  (0.22) 
ln_sales 0.1169 0.0793 0.2655 0.0854 -0.0753 
  (1.52) (1.22) (-0.59) (0.81) (-1.23) 
age -0.0025 -0.0040* 0.0072 -0.0017  -0.0048* 
  (-1.10) (-1.84) (0.38) (-0.38) (-1.68) 
price_volatility -0.0129 -0.0033 0.2418** -0.0597*** -0.0068 
  (-0.72) (-0.22) (2.60) (-2.96) (-0.42) 
n_analyst_recc 0.0049 -0.0002 0.0164 0.0007 0.0009 
  (0.33) (-0.01) (-0.22) (0.04) (0.08) 
industry 
env_sens_ind 0.3718 0.2458 1.7597 0.5352  0.1508 
  (1.57) (1.37) (-1.18) (1.51) (0.81) 
financial_ind -0.2087 -0.1166 0.3400 0.3363 -0.2178 
  (-0.54) (-0.40) (-0.10) (0.40) (-0.38) 
continent   
europe 0.2019 0.4016 6.8666*** -1.3985*** 0.4246 
  (0.46) (1.04) (3.15) (-2.82) (1.22) 
australasia  -0.7932 -0.3957 7.8573*** -1.8042***  0.5757 
  (-1.10) (-0.79) (3.25) (-3.45) (1.43) 
america -1.0400** -0.8034** 0.7074 -0.5749 0.4059 
  (-2.19) (-2.08) (0.43) (-1.61) (1.39) 
ifrs -0.3761 -0.2707 -0.0964 0.0198 -1.0045*** 
  (-0.75) (-0.65) (-0.06) (0.05) (-3.12) 
year (2014) 0.0459 0.0732 0.8764 0.7829*** 0.0153 
  (0.32) (0.72) (-1.30) (4.26) (0.10) 
_cons 11.0293*** 12.0492*** 22.0555*** 15.8433*** 50.8057*** 
  (8.57) (9.76) (3.36) (9.46) (49.61) 
N 104 104 104 104 104 
R-sq 0.373 0.422 0.283 0.308  0.217 
adj. R-sq 0.266 0.323 0.161 0.190 0.083 
F 7.473 7.835 8.475 8.209 2.961 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
This table presents the results of the first additional test. flesch_read is the flesch reading ease index; 
flesch_grade is the Flesch-Kincaid Grade level index; ln_length_words is the logarithm of the number of words; 
ln_length_characters is the logarithm of the number of characters; optimism_all is the DICTION optimism 
score with norm “all”. All the other variables are defined and measured as in Table 3. All robust standard errors 
are clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. T statistics are in brackets. 
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Table 8. Factor analysis 
 
 Factor pattern Factor pattern: varimax rotation 
 Factor 1 
(fac1) 
Factor 2 
(fac2) 
Factor 1 
(fac1r) 
Factor 2 
(fac2r) 
ln_length_page 0.7801 -0.0377 0.7654 -0.1553 
fog 0.4014 0.7600 0.5117 0.6906 
esg_discl_score 0.6007 0.1335 0.6140 0.0411 
optimism_cr -0.5021 0.7087 -0.3891 0.7765 
Eigenvalue 1.3826 1.0992 1.3761 1.1057 
This table provides the results of a factor analysis (principal component) of the four textual attributes. 
We present both the raw factor patterns (fac1 and fac2) as well as the patterns generated after a 
varimax rotation of the factors (fac1r and fac2r). The two factors are consistently retained with an 
eigenvalue above 1.0. 
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Table 9. Additional analysis (2) 
  fac1 fac2 fac1r fac2r 
roe -0.0032*** -0.0054*** -0.0040*** -0.0049*** 
  (-3.26) (-5.19) (-4.01) (-4.71) 
soc_score 0.0015 0.0029 0.0019 0.0026 
  (0.16) (0.31) (0.21) (0.27) 
env_score 0.0091 0.0046 0.0097 0.0032 
  (1.11) (0.57) (1.15) (0.41) 
gov_score -0.0018 0.0046 -0.0011 0.0048 
  (-0.40) (0.90) (-0.24) (0.93) 
ln_sales 0.0601 -0.0289 0.0550 -0.0377 
  (0.86) (-0.39) (0.78) (-0.52) 
age -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0032 
  (-0.79) (-1.25) (-0.93) (-1.11) 
price_volatility -0.0266* -0.0360** -0.0317** -0.0316* 
  (-1.84) (-2.07) (-2.34) (-1.75) 
n_analyst_recc 0.0215* -0.0082 0.0200 -0.0114 
  (1.75) (-0.70) (1.63) (-0.97) 
industry  
env_sens_ind 0.3578 0.3559 0.4075* 0.2977 
  (1.61) (1.51) (1.80) (1.29) 
financial_ind -0.4470 0.2363 -0.4061 0.3012 
  (-0.95) (0.49) (-0.82) (0.66) 
continent 
europe -0.6556* -0.3110 -0.6951** -0.2083 
  (-1.91) (-0.84) (-2.01) (-0.57) 
australasia  -1.3152*** -0.2690 -1.3408*** -0.0671 
  (-2.78) (-0.59) (-2.87) (-0.14) 
america -0.8249*** 0.2209 -0.7821*** 0.3631 
  (-3.20) (0.66) (-3.06) (1.01) 
ifrs 0.5466* -0.5530 0.4567 -0.6293 
  (1.76) (-1.35) (1.56) (-1.49) 
year (2014) 0.1153 0.5128*** 0.1915 0.4894*** 
  (0.82) (3.27) (1.38) (3.10) 
_cons -0.9088 0.8752 -0.7660 1.0026 
  (-0.83) (0.67) (-0.70) (0.77) 
N 104 104 104 104 
R-sq 0.379 0.289 0.380 0.289 
adj. R-sq 0.274 0.168 0.274 0.168 
F 13.440 6.267 12.850 6.367 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The variables fac1, fac2, fac1r and fac2r are the factor scores obtained from the factor analysis 
presented in Table 9. All the other variables are defined and measured as in Table 3. All robust 
standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T statistics are in brackets. 
 
 
